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Summary
The following article aims to analyse the alternative, pro-
Yugoslav and pro-democratizing options in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
from 1989 to mid-1990, until the beginning of the multi-party electoral 
campaign. The article focuses on three initiatives: the reformist wing 
of the League of Communists (SKBiH), the Alliance of Socialist Youth 
(SSOBiH) and the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative 
(UJDI). Particular attention is paid to their proposals on the main 
issues of the political crisis, as well as their conflicting relation with 
the declining communist regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SKBiH, 
notwithstanding its non-national and pro-Yugoslav stance, had a 
different approach on other issues, especially on political pluralism. 
The article points out that, on the eve of the 1990 elections, the 
competition within the non-national camp decisively weakened a 
pro-Yugoslav integrative option.
Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, non-national 
movements, League of Communists, UJDI, SSOBiH, Bosnian 
Initiative 
1 PhD Candidate, Dpt. of Modern and Contemporary History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) 
/ Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP). I would like to thank Chiara Milan, Davide Denti and Edin 
Omerčić for their insightful comments and suggestions on the earlier versions of this article.
Alfredo SASSO
The ‘Bosnian Silence’? Regime Decline and Civic Alternatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
28 29
Časopis za povijest Zapadne Hrvatske, IX./9., 2014.
1989. u jugoslavenskom kaleidoskopu / 1989 Through the Yugoslav Kaleidoscope
“It is evident that a positive Bosnian-Herzegovinian program does 
not exist.
In any case, it shall not be national, but primarily economic and 
political.
In the Yugoslav space, the ‘Bosnian silence’ [Bosanska šutnja] 
gradually converts itself into an intolerable wait-and-see policy, 
[waiting for] how the events develop in the other republics”.2 
In recent years, a new interest for exploring the alternatives to nationalist 
narratives and policies arouse in the literature dealing with the final stage of 
Yugoslavia.3 Three features distinguish those alternatives: democratizing, as they 
sought to introduce the full pre-conditions for political pluralism; Yugoslavist, as 
they aimed to preserve (and in some cases reinforce) the federal, supra-national 
framework, though combining it with the protection of sub-state autonomies 
and cultural specificities; civic, as they were based on the citizen as the founding 
element of the social and political system, hence preventing any ethno-national, 
religious or class exclusivism. The case of these alternatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is still understudied and gives rise to some dilemmas of categorization due to its 
specificity in the Yugoslav scenario. While the most of the republican branches of 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, hereafter 
SKJ) eventually adopted de facto nationalist policies, the League of Communists 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Savez Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, hereafter SKBiH) 
remained firmly pro-Yugoslav, owing to the ideological orthodoxy of its élite and 
to the national heterogeneity of the Bosnian republic. Until the late 1980s, anti-
nationalism as a cohesive factor made the Bosnian Communists still able to co-opt 
many intellectuals, youth movements and other potentially alternative actors. On 
the other hand, the ruling party had a wavering position on other issues such as 
the economic and political transition, switching from conservatism to some degree 
of reformism. For all those reasons, the civic options developed both inside and 
outside the existing institutional framework.
The three examples provided in the following paper are acknowledged as 
the more significant civic and pro-Yugoslav projects surfacing in the 1989 Bosnian 
2 Rasim Kadić, quoted in Zoran MILANOVIĆ, “Umjesto prednosti, sporenja“, Nedjelja, Sarajevo, September 
10, 1989, 6. All translations from sources in Serbo-Croatian-Bosnian language are by the author.
3 See in particular Bojan BILIĆ, Vesna JANKOVIĆ (eds.), Resisting the Evil: (Post-)Yugoslav Anti-War 
Contention, Baden Baden: Nomos, 2012; Bojan BILIĆ, We Were Gasping for Air: [Post-]Yugoslav Anti-War 
Activism and Its Legacy, Baden Baden: Nomos, 2012; Mila ORLIĆ, “Od postkomunizma do postjugoslavenstva. 
Udruženje za jugoslavensku demokratsku inicijativu”, Politička misao, 48, 4 (2011), 98-112; Ljubica 
SPASKOVSKA, “Vavilonski košmar.  Jugoslovenstvo, antinacionalizam, alternative 1989-1991”, Republika, 
532-535 (2012), URL: http://www.republika.co.rs/532-535/20.html (accessed December 12, 2014). See also the 
works of Ana Dević in the late 1990s, especially “Anti-War Initiatives and the Un-Making of Civic Identities in 
the Former Yugoslav Republics”, Journal of Historical Sociology, 10, 2 (1997), 127-156.
political space,4 representing three different status and kind of relationship vis-à-
vis the ruling party: 1) the radical reformist wing of the SKBiH promoted a self-
transformation of the party and the State; 2) the Alliance of the Socialist Youth 
(Savez Socijalističke Omladine BiH, hereafter SSOBiH), although being still an 
official organization, gradually converted itself into a separated political party 
after widening the “grey areas” of the regime’s control and flirting with opposition 
movements; 3) the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (Udruženje 
za Jugoslavensku Demokratsku Inicijativu, hereafter UJDI), was created outside 
the official framework and was mainly composed of progressive intellectuals. All 
these actors shared a common struggle to reverse what the SSOBiH’s leader Rasim 
Kadić had once defined as the “Bosnian silence” (“Bosanska šutnja”), referring 
to the passive stance that the party and the institutions in Sarajevo took towards 
both the events in the Yugoslav space (the Slovene-Serbian tensions, the conflict in 
Kosovo, the Milošević’s policy, etc.) and the demands for constitutional reforms in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.5 The scope of this article is, then, to examine the strategies, 
practices, discourses and interconnections of these collective actors, besides their 
(mainly conflicting) interaction with the Bosnian Communist authorities. It must be 
considered that until June 1990 ethno-national parties remained illegal in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, though they were de facto active since the beginning of that year 
and, for instance, already set in the rest of Yugoslavia even before. Henceforth, the 
competition in the Bosnian political spectrum was between an official Yugoslavism 
represented by the SKBiH, committed to the existing constitutional framework 
and the socialist symbolical references, and an alternative Yugoslavism advocated 
by party reformists, SSOBiH and UJDI, proposing a civic-based concept for the 
Bosnian and Yugoslavian institutions.6 The analysis of this polarization can help 
to understand how and why the non-national options failed so dramatically during 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s transition.
The article draws on three types of sources. The first is a wide range of 
press reports coming from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the rest of Yugoslavia, mostly 
from Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), the main Bosnian daily newspaper at that time, as 
well as from the daily Borba (Belgrade), Bosanski Glas (Banja Luka), the weekly 
4 The focus is placed on the first stage in the development of alternatives in the Bosnian political spectrum. 
This context is prior to the definitive introduction of a multi-party system, which formally took place in 
July 1990. Hence, this article does not contemplate the Ante Marković’s party, the Alliance of the Reformist 
Forces (Savez Reformskih Snaga Jugoslavije, hereafter SRSJ), which was created in late July 1990. 
In 1989, there was also another civic-Yugoslav actor active in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Greens’ Movement 
(Pokret Zelenih), yet it did not gain enough visibility in the public sphere, nor envisaged concrete proposals for 
political reform as the three aforementioned actors did.
5 Zoran MILANOVIĆ, “Umjesto prednosti, sporenja”, Nedjelja, Sarajevo, September 10, 1989, 6.
6 For an in-depth conceptualization of the “institutional/socialist” vs. “the alternative/progressive” Yugoslav 
supra-nationalism in Yugoslavia, see Ljubica SPASKOVSKA, “Landscapes of Resistance, Hope and Loss: 
Yugoslav Supra-Nationalism and Anti-Nationalism”, in Bojan BILIĆ, Vesna JANKOVIĆ, (eds.), Resisting the 
Evil, 37-61.
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1989. u jugoslavenskom kaleidoskopu / 1989 Through the Yugoslav Kaleidoscope
magazines Danas (Croatia) and Nedjelja (Sarajevo), and the youth magazines Naši 
Dani, Valter (Sarajevo) and Prelom (Banja Luka). Such combination offers access 
to a broad coverage of socio-political events, statements, interviews, etc., as well 
as a plurality of qualitative points of view, enhancing a critical handling of the 
documentation. It must be taken into account that in that period Oslobođenje, 
still an organ of the official Bosnian Communist organizations, was gradually 
(though not steadily) shifting from a pro-regime discourse to a more pluralist 
tendency and to an attitude of respect of independence standards. On the other 
hand, the Bosnian youth press acted both as a vehicle of mobilization for youth 
social movements, and as a practice of pluralist attitude and professional accuracy. 
The second type of source is a range of original documents (session transcripts, 
programmatic documents, statements) issued by the SKBiH and the SSOBiH. 
Most of them come from the uncatalogued archive of the Social Democratic Party 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. They contribute to retrace both the internal 
debate and the public positioning of these organizations, which would have been 
overlooked or misrepresented through an exclusive use of press sources. The third 
type of source is a set of selected interviews with former representatives of the 
organizations constituting the subject of the study. These interviews contribute to 
retrace concrete information and useful insights on the strategies, perceptions and 
interpretations of both individual and collective actors belonging to an alternative 
scene that still awaits thorough exploration.  
1. From the “Bosnian silence” to the “Bosnian initiative”: the reformists 
inside the SKBiH
In 1989, when controversies on the framework of Yugoslavia led to 
a sharp polarization between the Serbian (centralism, hegemonism) and the 
Slovenian program (decentralization to secessionism, pluralism), the SKBiH did 
not take a clear side for two structural reasons. Firstly, unlike the other republics, 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina a strong ideological orthodoxy and adherence to Titoist 
routines had consolidated during the previous decades and persisted even after 
the abrupt change and rejuvenation of the leadership caused by the various 
financial, corruption and intra-élite affaires (especially the cases “Agrokomerc” 
and “Neum”) in the late 1980s.7 Secondly, due to the peculiar and heterogeneous 
7 Vladimir GOATI, “La vida política, 1989-1992”, in Josep PALAU, Radha KUMAR (eds.), Ex-Yugoslavia: 
de la guerra a la paz, Valencia: MPDL, 1992, 243-255; Saša MRDULJAŠ, “Doprinos vladajućih bosansko-
hercegovačkih stranaka izbijanju rata u Bosni i Hercegovini“, Suvremene Teme, 4, 1 (2011), 47-48. On the 
affaires, see Neven ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The end of a legacy, London: Frank Cass, 2003, 76-119 
(chapt. 3, 4); Admir MULAOSMANOVIĆ, “O političkom kontekstu ‘Afere Agrokomerc’”, Historijska traganja, 
1, (2008) 181-211.  
national structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, taking sides could seriously undermine 
the political and social stability. Hence, even when some relevant disputes arose 
within the SKBiH on sensitive issues such as the crisis in Kosovo, the policies of 
Slobodan Milošević or the interference of Belgrade’s institutional, security and 
military circles in Bosnia-Herzegovina,8 the party élite still managed to reach 
some compromise. On the other hand, while no significant incidents on national 
grounds from below had happened until 1989,9 some mobilization with ethno-
national symbols and demands did appear throughout the year. 10 Still, they were 
concentrated in some particular areas, mostly originating from local factors, 
such as small-scale political struggles or the projection of an “anti-bureaucratic 
frame” from the events in Serbia, rather than a widespread discomfort with the 
condition of inter-ethnic relations. According to a poll held in October 1989 by 
the Institute for the Study of Inter-ethnic relation in Sarajevo, 90% of surveyed 
Bosnians positively assessed the inter-ethnic relations in the place they lived in, 
and 80,7% claimed the same about their workplace. The same poll also showed a 
strong commitment with Yugoslav unity, given that 87,26% favoured an identical 
or stronger integration in the federation and 94,54% related the existence and the 
progress of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the progress of the entire Yugoslav state.11 
While the SKBiH constantly endorsed the status quo on the framework of 
Yugoslavia, firmly defending the 1974 Constitution and rejecting both confederal 
and unionist claims, its orientation on political pluralism wavered in the course 
of 1989. In March, the Central Committee rejected any chance for multi-party 
system, reasserting the canonical formula of “pluralism without parties” within 
the socialist self-management system.12 Besides ideological loyalty, the Bosnian 
Communists claimed that national parties would inevitably appear and bring 
inter-ethnic tensions, as it had been the case in the Interwar period (1919-1941). 
The narrative against nationalism, constantly depicting a “national threat” from 
outside the regime, had been for decades a factor for the homogenization of the 
Bosnian élite, putting aside eventual demands for reforming or re-discussing the 
ruling system.13
8 I refer here to the operation held in mid-1989 by the Serbian security services (SDB) in the Bosnian 
municipalities of Bratunac and Srebrenica, which significantly worsened the relations between Sarajevo and 
Belgrade. (ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 110; Sabina VELADŽIĆ, “Destabilizacija Bosne i Hercegovine 
krajem osamdesetih godina 20. stoljeća”, Historijska traganja, 7 (2011), 208-209.
9 Neven ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 67.
10 I refer here to the Serbs’ mobilizations in Nevesinje and Šipovo, the Serb-Muslim communitarian tensions 
in Gacko, Srebrenica and Vlasenica, and the Croats’ mobilizations in Duvno and Western Herzegovina. See 
ANDJELIĆ, ibidem, 107-110; Sabina VELADŽIĆ, “Destabilizacija Bosne i Hercegovine”, 220-223; Ivica 
LUČIĆ, “Duvno kao žarište ‘hrvatskog nacionalizma i katoličkog Klerikalizma’ u zadnjem desetljeću 
komunističke vlasti”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 3 (2012), 571-602.
11 Ibrahim BAKIĆ, Ratko DUNĐEROVIĆ, Građani Bosne i Hercegovine o međunacionalnim odnosima, 
Sarajevo: Institut za proučavanje nacionalnih odnosa, 1990, 25-27, 32.
12 “Za šta se zalaže Savez Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine”, Sarajevo: SKBiH, 1989, 20.
13 I am grateful to Professor Husnija Kamberović for these insights.
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A few prominent members of the SKBiH began to advocate for a legalization 
of the non-regime organizations. The most challenging voice among them was 
Zdravko Grebo, a relatively young newcomer in the party’s Central Committee, 
who openly asked to abandon the monopoly of power and explicitly blamed the 
top-ranks of the party. Grebo quickly attracted a certain interest from the media 
and gained wide popularity in the urban and intellectual circles.14 Reform-minded 
demands were grounded on various assumptions. Rasim Kadić, the president of 
the SSOBiH, the youth wing of the party, was one of the first politicians in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to advocate for a “civic”, rather than national or classist, conception 
of the citizenship. 15 Moreover, Desimir Međović claimed that economic reforms 
(which were already ongoing in Yugoslavia under the federal government of Ante 
Marković) should automatically lead to a multi-party system in order to permit 
the representation of multiple interests.16 By contrast, according to the SKBiH’s 
officials, the opening up to market and private property could be implemented 
without any political change.17
None of these arguments found a major support in the party, since political 
homogeneity and resistance to change were (albeit nominally) strong. Yet, they 
gained force in the last months of 1989 for at least four reasons. First, the wave of 
events in the communist countries in Central-Eastern Europe, properly reported 
by the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, raised the expectations 
for political innovation. Second, the increasing political tensions within the SKJ 
weakened the ideological premises of Bosnian communists. Third, the progress 
of Marković’s economic reforms undermined, too, the dogmatic devotion to self-
management and socialism. Fourth, the consolidation of a de-facto (and soon to 
be legalized) multi-party system in Slovenia and Croatia eroded the confidence of 
the Bosnian leaders in keep a hold on power. Hence, in late 1989, the president of 
the SKBiH Nijaz Duraković began to envisage a detachment from power and the 
14 “Zdravko Grebo in “Jako ili nikako!”, Oslobođenje, July 10, 1989, 3; “U borbu s partijskim drugovima, 
a ne partijskim rođacima“, Oslobođenje, September 13 1989, 3. Grebo, born in 1947, was a Law Professor at 
the University of Sarajevo. He became a member of the SKBiH’s Central Committee in late 1987. He was also 
a member of Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), but resigned from it in 
July 1989, arguing that it had become the incubator for all the possible conflicts, from class to generational and 
national-based ones.
15 Moreover, demanding a civic concept of citizenship in the Bosnia-Herzegovina context could be 
interpreted (although it was not directly mentioned) as implying to overcome the principle of “national key” 
(“nacionalni kljuć”), namely the proportional repartition of posts in institutional and professional domains 
according to national belonging, which was strictly applied under the Communist rule. On the “national 
key”, see: Tatjana SEKULIĆ, Violenza etnica. I Balcani tra etnonazionalismo e democrazia, Carocci Editore, 
Roma, 2002, 98; Xavier BOUGAREL, “Bosnie-Herzégovine: anatomie d’une poudrière”, Herodote, 67 
(1992), 137-138.
16 “Iz uvodnog izlaganja Desimira Međovića: Tržište najbolji mehanizam uređivanja ekonomije”, Oslobođenje, 
February 17, 1989, 2; “SK ne želi monopol“, Nedelja, September 9, 1989, 5. Desimir Međović, born in 1956, was 
then a professor at the Faculty of Economics at the University of Sarajevo.
17 See the speech of the then president of the Bosnian Parlament, Zlatan Karavdić: “Nema demokratije bez 
reda“, in Oslobođenje, 26 June 1989.
introduction of some sort of multi-party system, though maintaining the ban on 
national parties.18
A potential stage for setting the premises to political reforms was the 10th 
Congress of the SKBiH, scheduled in December 1989.19 A pro-reform group of 14 
delegates, led by the aforementioned Grebo and Međović, came up and challenged 
the ongoing impasse, by submitting a short and simple petition demanding the 
immediate and integral application of the 1944 “ZAVNOBiH Declaration” 
which called for free political association, for free elections by secret ballot 
and for the freedom of private economic initiative.20 Such reference provided a 
strong historical-symbolical legitimation (Andjelić called it “a powerful attack 
on communist power”)21 evidencing that the monopolistic praxis had distorted 
or suspended the original principles of the antifascist resistance and that new 
circumstances should lead to restore them.
However, the initiative did not find much support, except for the 
predictable endorsement of the SSOBiH and of some isolated reform-minded 
members.22 Almost the entire party leadership and the majority of the Congress’ 
delegates were inclined instead to ease the internal differences and to keep an “in-
between” position in every field, fearing that an alteration of status quo could open 
the “Pandora box” of the main underneath disputes potentially lethal for internal 
stability. Hence, the ZAVNOBiH initiative was approved at the end of the Congress 
only as a generic appeal to the institutions, but was neither a binding measure, nor 
it envisaged concrete terms and conditions for its formal adoption. The Parliament 
only set up an ineffective working group dealing with the proposal.23 A first, partial 
and incomplete law on political association was issued on February 21, 1990, but 
it was immediately suspended and submitted to revision due to hesitations within 
the ruling party. The definitive law establishing the conditions for multi-party 
18 A. ŠARAC, “Nijaz Duraković na tribini GK SSRN Sarajevo: nema demokratije bez reda“, Oslobođenje, 
December 1, 1989, 2.
19 It was scheduled as preliminary to the famous XIV extraordinary Congress of the SKJ.
20 Archive of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, SDP headquarters in Sarajevo (uncatalogued), 
“Inicijativa”, Sarajevo: X Congress of the SKBiH, 1989. The 14 subscribers were Stijepo Andrijić, Mihajlo Bakić, 
Vjeko Domljan, Zdravko Grebo, Hidajeta Hamurović, Dragan Kragulj, Juraj Martinović, Desimir Međović, 
Mladenko Nikić, Stojko Pejić, Osman Pirija, Esad Salihbasić, Momo Ševarika, Ratko Vujović. The petition had 
been originally conceived, shortly before the Congress by a group of five Bosnian intellectuals, Tarik Haverić, Ivan 
Lovrenović, Miodrag Živanović and the Central Committee’s members Grebo and Međović. The ZAVNOBiH 
had been the highest ruling organ of the Partisan anti-fascist movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1943 and 
1945 and the main basis of republican statehood. The complete name of the aforementioned historical document 
is ““Declaration on the citizens’ rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, issued in the 2nd ZAVNOBiH session held 
on July 1, 1944 in Sanski Most.
21 ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 93.
22 SDP Archive in Sarajevo (uncatalogued), Rasim Kadić in “Magnetofonski snimak desetog Kongresa 
SKBiH”, 7., 8. i 9.Decembar 1989.godine”, 233/2, 3.
23 SDP Archive in Sarajevo (uncatalogued), Ivan Cvitković in “Magnetofonski snimak…”, 237; Miodrag 
ŽIVANOVIĆ, “Poruke ZAVNOBiH-a: Vratimo dostojanstvo”, Al Jazeera Balkans, November 25, 2011, URL: 
http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/poruke-zavnobih-vratimo-dostojanstvo, accessed July 30, 2013.  
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system was ratified as late as in July 1990. The ZAVNOBiH initiative also failed in 
its broader purpose of opening an internal debate among the Bosnian Communists 
about political transformation. The fact that some ultra-conservative delegates 
suggested to arrest the petition’s promoters reveals the unchanged extent of such 
suspicions and fears.24
The hidden dispute between SKBiH’s conservatives and reformers was 
moved into the arena of the XIV Congress of the SKJ, scheduled for January 20-
22, 1990. While all the attention of the media (and, retrospectively, of scholars) was 
focused on the Slovene-Serb conflict, an unexpected (and, to this day, unexplored 
by literature) event had important consequences on the political history of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. On January 21, a document began to circulate among Congress’ 
delegates, calling for a drastic solution to the Yugoslav crisis through a voluntary 
split of the SKJ within two parties: a “Communist Party of Yugoslavia”, with an 
orthodox and dogmatic orientation; and a “Socialist Party of Yugoslavia”, with a 
social-democrat and reformist orientation. The document claimed that the crucial 
differentiation within the SKJ was not national or cultural (although these factors 
were noticeable too), but ideological. Since the forced unity was the primary 
cause of the tensions within the regime, the recommended solution consisted in a 
“legalization of the political difference” for preventing the otherwise unavoidable 
schism along republican and/or national lines. Moreover, the creation of two 
separate parties would automatically create a multi-party system, bringing about 
a democratic transformation of Yugoslavia.25 The original idea for the amendment 
emerged during an informal meeting gathered by a small group of liberal-oriented 
delegates coming from different republics, the majority of them from Montenegro 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.26 At the very last moment, the Montenegrin delegates 
renounced to sign the amendment, probably because of pressures received by their 
pro- Milošević leaders,27 while a group of liberal-wing Croatians converged on 
a very similar amendment headed by the influent economist Branko Horvat.28 
As the five remaining promoters were all from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Zdravko 
Grebo, Desimir Međović, Miloš Jelić, Dejan Mastilović and Zoran Perković) the 
24 ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 93.
25 The text of the initiative was reported in “Amandman grupe delegata: jednu podeliti – na dve”, Borba, 
Beograd, January 23, 1990, 2.
26 Zdravko Grebo claims that the then young Montenegrins (and future prominent politicians) Ljubiša 
Stanković and Srđan Darmanović played a leading role among the original supporters. According to Grebo, the 
fact that the first version of the document was written in ‘ekavian’ would be a further proof of the Montenegrins’ 
influence in the group. “Podjela prava na legitimitet”, Oslobođenje 31 January 1990; Zdravko Grebo, interview 
by author, Sarajevo, May 11, 2012.
27 Zdravko Grebo, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 11, 2012.
28 The Horvat motion also proposed the SKJ’s split into a hard-line and a reformist wing. It was even more 
radical, recommending implementing the division instantly, whilst the “Bosnian Initiative” suggested a transition 
period of six months in which the two parties should elaborate their programs and celebrate their founding 
congresses. However, the Horvat motion had even less support, receiving only 16 votes in favour. “Nema povratka 
na stari sistem”, Borba, January 23, 1990, 3.
amendment was quickly labelled, in the congress’ circles and in the press jargon, 
as the “Bosnian Initiative” (Bosanska inicijativa). 
However, this initiative failed dramatically. On January 22, the petition 
received only 58 votes in support, barely 3,5% of the 1655 total delegates. The 
Međović’s speech addressing the petition to the Congress was interrupted by boos 
and whistles coming especially from conservative delegates who did not approve 
the intent to divide the party.29 Yet, the most vehement and shocking reaction 
was that of the president of the SKBiH Nijaz Duraković who, immediately 
after Međović’s intervention, said: “For those who want to leave the League of 
Communists, the doors are open and it would be more fair for everyone who 
is, maybe rightly, so drastically dissatisfied with this League of Communists, 
to display their own ambitions and their own political programmes out of our 
organization, and especially out of this Congress. Please, don’t look for help from 
this Congress [...] We must look out for these foreign Danaans who only bring us 
discord”.30
At first, these words sounded ambiguous: as the Belgrade-Ljubljana dispute 
spread across the congress, the sentence “The doors are open” could have easily 
been referred to the Slovene delegates who were about to leave the party and, in 
other words, misinterpreted as a support for the Milošević’s policy.31 Nonetheless, 
Duraković later convincingly clarified that his targets were the promoters of the 
“Bosnian Initiative” and not the Slovene delegates.32 Duraković and Grebo’s 
stances were two irreconcilable conceptions of political representation and, at the 
same time, two opposite forms of Yugoslavism. Duraković, still loyal to some sort 
of democratic centralism, wanted to impose respect to the republican discipline 
and to seek an agreement within the existing consociational structures. He was 
troubled by the fact that the initiative could be misinterpreted as the position of 
all the Bosnian Communists, whereas he wanted the SKBiH to play a mediating 
and low-profile role. On the other side, Grebo and his fellows argued that every 
individual should have had the right to submit proposal without previous debate 
or authorizations, and that a Federal Yugoslavia should be rebuilt on a completely 
new basis.
These events had serious consequences for the future of the SKBiH. 
Although they were not followed by immediate sanctions nor expulsions, 
29 “Nema povratka na stari sistem”, Borba, January 23, 1990, 3.
30 “Odbijen Savez Saveza”, Oslobođenje, January 23, 1990, 5. This was a metaphorical reference to the Latin 
phrase from the Virgil’s Aeneid “Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes” (“Beware of Greeks bearing gifts”).
31 Some even speculated that Duraković’s aggressive outburst had been generated by direct pressures from 
Milošević and the Serbian top-ranks, emphasizing the loud applause that Duraković’s speech received from the 
Serbian and Montenegrin bloc. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that Duraković led the SKBiH to reject 
(together with the party delegations from Croatia, Macedonia and the Army) the Milošević’s attempt to force the 
Congress’ continuation. This indicates that Duraković was far from being subjugated by the Serbian leadership.
32 “Opštejugoslovenski karakter SKBiH”, Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, January 26, 1990.
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they brought many of the reform-oriented members either to leave the SKBiH 
(considering that there was no chance for innovating the party from within), 33 or 
to lessen the tone of their proposals. This polarization reinforced the stigma of 
dogmatism attributed to the Bosnian Communists, that “burden from the past” 
(“hipoteka iz prošlosti”) which would fill up the narratives of both nationalist and 
civic Bosnian parties prior to the 1990 elections. Paradoxically, the new Bosnian 
political élite led by Duraković was rather young, newcomer and not completely 
hostile to reforms. Yet, its lack of political experience, together with the inability 
to face the burden of the enormous pressures coming from Belgrade’s military 
and political circles, prevented the Bosnian leaders from accepting the instances 
of immediate change coming from the radical reformers. In spring 1990, the ultra-
conservative JNA’s top ranks went as far as to threaten the SKBiH with a military 
intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to prevent any substantial reform of 
the political order, including the call of multi-party elections that Duraković was 
then considering.34
On the other hand, that alternative milieu did not develop a convincing 
strategy to gain more influence. Even Desimir Međović later admitted that the 
proposal to split the SKJ was “too radical, surprising and unusual”, although 
justified as an attempt to provoke a radical shock within what he called “the 
centre of Yugoslav chaos”.35 First, Grebo and Međović miscalculated the potential 
support from other delegation; although they had especially hoped to convince 
some Slovenes and prevent their walkout, the Ljubljana’s delegates showed 
absolutely no interest in the initiative, as they were solidly committed to a further 
confederalization of the country. Second, the Bosnian reformists overlooked that 
the creation of two separate parties, a hard-line conservative one and a hard-line 
liberal one, could have incited only further instability and polarization. Hence, 
although both the “ZAVNOBiH Initiative” and “Bosnian initiative” have been 
properly hailed as the “proof of the consolidation of civil society in Bosnia-
Herzegovina”,36 they also revealed the marginalization of the civic alternatives in 
the political spectrum.
33 Among the active supporters of the “ZAVNOBiH” and “Bosnian” initiatives, only Zoran Perković actively 
remained in party leadership. Zdravko Grebo and Desimir Međović left the SKBiH and went back to their 
academic professions. After the 1990 elections, Grebo would return to active engagement in civic, non-parties-
related initiatives. Rasim Kadić, too, left the SKBiH. Under his leadership, the SSOBiH departed from the 
Communist movement (see part 2 of this work).
34 Ivo KOMŠIĆ, Preživljena zemlja, Zagreb: Prometej, 2006, 47-49; Nijaz DURAKOVIĆ, Muhamed 
FILIPOVIĆ, Tragedija Bosne, Sarajevo: Vrtlog, 2002, 147, 167; Adil Kulenović, interview by author, Sarajevo, 
July 27, 2014.
35 Desimir Međović in Vlastimir MIJOVIĆ, “Strah od otvorenih vrata”, Danas, Zagreb, February 6, 1990.
36 ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 115-116.
2. Youth activism and liberal democracy: the SSOBiH
During the late 1980s, economic crisis and unemployment severely 
affected youth in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, fuelling a certain disillusion 
from the values and rituals of the socialist system. Alternative spaces for socio-
cultural and artistic production (such as punk, rock and new wave groups, artistic 
performances, youth centres) were established in all the main cities in Yugoslavia 
since the early 1980s, involving especially a middle-class urban youth frustrated 
for the lack of social perspectives. Sarajevo, in particular, was a stronghold of a 
vibrant youth scene, ranging from the more conventional “New Partisan” rock 
to a more subversive and counter-cultural milieu (best represented by the “New 
Primitives” cultural movement) which expressed open criticism to the ruling 
ideology and social reality.37 However, detachment from the socialist tradition did 
not mean a detachment from Yugoslavism; on the contrary, many of these cultural 
expressions meant to reanimate, re-elaborate and advocate the foundational values 
of Yugoslav unity.38
Until the end of the decade, this scene did not articulate itself politically 
in the Bosnian public space, due to a still firm grasp of the Communist structures, 
which employed either soft co-optation or hard control of student activists.39 The 
first significant protests took place in autumn 1987 at the University of Sarajevo, 
but were limited to concrete demands such as the relaxation of exam norms or 
better conditions at the students’ canteens. Protesters submitted no requests to 
the ruling Bosnian government about educational policies, let alone about broader 
socio-political changes. Several Bosnian youth organizations feared the potential 
accusations from the Communist structures which, at that time, still tagged any 
opposition movement as hostile or even as “nationalist”, even in absence of any 
ethnic-related content.40
However, those mobilizations led to the creation of new students’ 
organizations and networks under the umbrella of the Alliance of Socialist Youth 
(SSOBiH), namely the youth wing of the ruling party. Besides social activism, 
youth organizations from Bosnia-Herzegovina got primarily involved in the media 
space. The magazines Naši Dani and Valter became one of the publications with 
37 For some in-depth analysis of the youth artistic scene in 1980s Bosnia and Yugoslavia see in particular Dalibor 
MIŠINA, “’Spit and Sing, My Yugoslavia’: New Partisans, social critique and Bosnian poetics of the patriotic”, 
Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 38:2 (2010) 265-289; Sabina RAMET, Balkan 
Babel. The disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the fall of Milošević, Boulder: Westview press, 
1999, 126-148 (chapt. 7, “Rock Music”); Claudia MURESU, “Subversive Art as a Movement or Performance 
in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Subversion of What?”, MA dissertation, Università di Bologna, 2012.
38 MIŠINA, “’Spit and Sing, My Yugoslavia’, 265-266.
39 Nerzuk Ćurak, interview by author, Sarajevo, June 11, 2012; Husnija Kamberović, interview by author, 
Sarajevo, June 28, 2012.
40 Ibidem; ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 78.
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the widest circulation and biggest political influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.41 
They combined plural editorial styles, including in-depth political analysis and 
reports (sometimes hosting contributions of respected academics and intellectuals), 
interviews with high politicians from all the sides of the spectrum (Communist 
officials, nationalist leaders and civic activists), highly satirical columns, 
provocative titles, comic strips, images and photomontages usually mocking the 
political elite and the iconography of socialism. Another successful experience 
was the “Youth program” (Omladinski Program) broadcasted in the second 
channel of Radio Sarajevo. The program gave voice to social-political critique 
and satire, gaining growing autonomy from the control of the Communist party.42 
Those media, in the words of Nerzuk Ćurak, became the first “oasis of pioneering 
elements of civil society” in late-socialist Bosnia-Herzegovina.43 Due to their 
full coverage of the all-Yugoslav events, their interconnections with homologue 
youth medias and associations from the whole Federation, and their interest in the 
main global trends in politics, social engagement and culture, these media can be 
considered as a notable example of what Ana Dević defined “Yugo-cosmopolitan 
habitus” of Yugoslav youngsters in late 1980s.44
Since 1987 the Bosnian Communists were experiencing a severe crisis of 
legitimacy after the wave of intra-élite resignations and replacement following the 
“Agrokomerc” and “Neum” affaires. This context allowed a broader space for public 
debates and criticism against the corruption and inefficiency of the political power. 
In 1988-1989, the SSOBiH vetoed, for the first time in history, the appointment of 
some old-guard candidates for the Presidency and Prime Minister’s posts.45 Then, 
the new leadership of the SSOBiH, composed by the president Rasim Kadić and 
his close collaborators Đorđe Latinović and Martin Raguž made a turning point in 
the policy of the organization. They sought to gradually quit being only a youth-
centred movement, transforming the organization into a proper political party with 
a liberal-democratic and pro-individual stance and without age limits, reducing 
the ties with the Yugoslav coordination of the Alliances of Socialist Youth (the 
41 According to Nerzuk Ćurak, then a member of the Naši Dani’s editors’ committee, in the 1987-1990 period 
the circulation of both Naši Dani and Valter ranged among 25.000 and 60.000 copies (Nerzuk Ćurak, interview 
by author, Sarajevo, June 11, 2012). The two main (and official) newspapers in Sarajevo, Večernje Novine and 
Oslobođenje, respectively had a circulation of 66.911 and 47.690 copies in 1990 (source: RAMET, Balkan Babel, 
41). Other youth magazines with critical attitudes also emerged in the rest of the country, such as Prelom in Banja 
Luka or Lom in Mostar, but they had much less public impact.
42 According to official figures, the Omladinski Program had about 800.000 daily listeners in 1988 
(“Jugoslovenski omladinski radio”, Valter, April 7, 1989). On the role of the program throughout the 1980s, see 
Neven ANDJELIĆ,  “The evolution of civil society in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina”, in Stefano BIANCHINI 
and George SCHÖPLIN (eds.) State Building in the Balkans: Dilemmas on the Eve of the 21st Century, Ravenna: 
Longo Editore, 299-303; MURESU, “Subversive Art”, 60-63.
43 Nerzuk Ćurak, interview by author, Sarajevo, June 11, 2012. See also chapter 3 in ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 76-95.
44 DEVIĆ, “Anti-War Initiatives“, 150.
45 ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 70-71, 89-90.
SSOJ) and with the SKBiH.46 The Bosnian Communists, weakened by the loss in 
self-confidence and élite cohesion after the domestic scandals and the strains with 
Belgrade, did not take any action against their youth wing. “The reaction of the 
SKBiH was negative, but they did not have enough force to prevent it. For what I 
know, they submitted no action against me personally, to prevent me from doing 
my job”, 47 recalls Rasim Kadić, who individually left the SKBiH in January 1990, 
shortly after the XIV Congress.48 
The SSOBiH’s main claims included a civic and non-national concept 
of citizenship, multi-party pluralism, the “de-politicization” of the State and a 
market economy. All these principles were included in the “Political Manifesto” 
the SSOBiH issued in October 1989:49 it was the first time ever that an official 
organization demanded such broad changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SSO’s 
support for a non-ethnic concept of citizenship mirrored not only the pro-civic 
stance of its élite, but also the dominant orientation among the overall Bosnia’s 
youth. According to a survey held in October 1989 by the Institute for the Study 
of Inter-ethnic relations, people under 27 years of age were the most incline to 
abandon the “national key” as the criteria for selecting cadres at the administrative 
and political organs (72,45%, versus 51,28% in the 43-51 years’ range and 45% in 
the 52+ years’ range). Nevertheless, youngsters were generally the most sceptical 
about the actual state of inter-ethnic relations in Yugoslavia. Among the under-27, 
those who agreed that all the nations “have equal conditions for social promotion 
in education, hiring, and status” were 44%, whilst those older than 27 years ranged 
from 57% to 60%. Therefore, the survey’s authors assumed that youth, as the most 
affected by the socio-economic situation, tended to project their discomfort onto 
the national question, even if national difference in itself did not significantly 
concern them. They seemed thus incline to see the “national key” criteria as an 
obstacle, rather than a facilitation, to their social ambitions.50
A focal point in the SSOBiH’s discourse about transition was the full 
legalization of the national parties. Apparently, this position contradicted the 
anti-nationalist stance of the organization. Nevertheless, it was also consistent 
with the liberal views of the leadership and, above all, with its criticism to 
the Communists’ policy, interpreted as a mere tool to keep the power. Kadić 
comments: “I was really convinced that the society must be relieved and 
liberalized. In that moment, I underestimated the nationalist forces in Bosnia, 
and I admit it. I believed that nationalists would not be so strong and that we 
could politically organize ourselves. I believed that we could, as a so-called left 
46 S. NUMANOVIĆ, “Pred Kongres Omladine BiH. Biti ili ne biti“,Oslobođenje, July 25, 1989.
47 Rasim Kadić, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 23, 2012.
48 Lj. GRKOVIĆ, “Prvi bh. Omladinac nije više član SK. Politički presedan“, Oslobođenje, January 30, 1990.
49 “Rasim Kadić na sjednici GK SSO. Nek’ dođu da i mene uhapse“, Valter, November 17, 1989, 2.
50 Ibrahim BAKIĆ, Ratko DUNĐEROVIĆ, Građani Bosne i Hercegovine o međunacionalnim odnosima, 104-105.
Alfredo SASSO
The ‘Bosnian Silence’? Regime Decline and Civic Alternatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
40 41
Časopis za povijest Zapadne Hrvatske, IX./9., 2014.
1989. u jugoslavenskom kaleidoskopu / 1989 Through the Yugoslav Kaleidoscope
or centre, be the most stable part of Bosnia; still, the elections have showed that 
we were the most weak”.51
However, the “new course” imposed by Kadić did not encounter unanimous 
support within the organization. A conservative-minded opposition came mainly 
from the Banja Luka section and from the Bosnian Krajina and Eastern Bosnia 
regions.52 Since those areas were mainly Serb-populated, this presence could be 
interpreted as a symptom of national divisions caused by conflicting assessments 
about the politics in Yugoslavia.53 Although this was surely a leading reason, 
reducing these tensions to mere ethno-nationalism would be misleading. Other 
factors were also relevant, such as a standard competition for leadership (having a 
top post at the republican level of the organization granted attractive salaries and 
benefits) or a centre-periphery resentment between the “capital” Sarajevo and the 
“provincial” Banja Luka (this was, for instance, a quite common cleavage in the 
official organizations and institutions about the control of policies, investments, 
etc.). Moreover, the opposition to Kadić did not only come from hard-line 
conservatives. Some pro-liberal activists from the SSO in Sarajevo provocatively 
argued that the organization, being useless for young people, should be dissolved 
and reconstructed on a voluntary, youth-centred and non-political basis.54 Such 
a rejection of the clique of salaried politicians and officers, and the search for 
new forms of social-political engagement claims, were consistent with the context 
of the 1989 “transition euphoria”, stemming from the perception of an imminent 
detachment from the regime. This stance was diametrically opposite to the major 
strategic interest of the Kadić’s leadership, consisting of keeping control over the 
huge infrastructure and property portfolio that a forty-five-years long status of 
“official organization” could guarantee (local sections, access to public funds, 
properties and human resources) in view of the electoral campaign.55
The 12th Congress of the SSOBiH scheduled for April 19 and 20, 1990, 
was expected to be a turning point for the organization. Kadić’s leadership 
planned it as a stage for the definitive transition into a liberal-democrat political 
party and presented an opening document envisaging a “radical reconstruction” of 
51 Rasim Kadić, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 23, 2012. See also Gordana BOŽIĆ, “Conversations with 
Bosnian Youth: From the Youth Relay Race to the Successor Generation Initiative”, in Nationalities Papers: The 
Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 35:4 (2007), 743-772.
52 Mirsad HALILOVIĆ, “Nakon zborovanja banjalučkih studenata. ‘Ovo je ludnica’“, Prelom, Banja Luka, 
November 1989, 13; “Seminar o budućoj organizovanosti omladine BiH. Strah od burokratizacije“, Oslobođenje, 
December 24, 1989; Rasim Kadić, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 23, 2012.
53 ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 102.
54 A supporter of this “anti-party faction” was Neven Andjelić, who in 1989 ran as a candidate for the Presidency 
of the SSOBiH in Sarajevo. In 1990, he left the organization and joined the SRSJ. Neven Andjelić, interview by 
author, Sarajevo, June 21, 2014.
55 Kadić recalls: “We had an excellent campaign for those times, very modern, since we inherited money 
thanks to the fact that we were always included in the [state] budget. And that inherited budget, we spent it in 
the best way for those times, through the organization of posters, media events, and the recruitment of excellent 
candidates”. Rasim Kadić, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 23, 2012.
the Yugoslav economic system focused on the principle of efficiency, through an 
integrated market of capitals, labour and goods.56 The document also proposed a 
complete constitutional reform of Yugoslavia as a federal, parliamentary multi-party 
democracy, ratifying the SSOBiH’s pro-Yugoslav stance,57 as well as a complete 
de-politicization of all institution (Army, justice, education, administration, etc.).58 
Finally, the document proudly asserted the cultural, historical and symbolical ties 
between Yugoslavia and Europe, demanding a quick integration into the European 
Community.59 
Yet, the Congress never adopted this document, as it failed to be ratified 
by a full majority of the delegates.60 The clash inside the SSOBiH between the 
leadership and the conservatives, who still counted on the considerable support of 
the territorial representatives, led to the rejection of all the amendments that could 
have marked a radical break with the Communist symbolic universe, such as the 
request to remove the attribute “Socialist” from the official name of the Republic 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the demand to revise the relations within the Yugoslav 
Socialist Youth (SSOJ).61 Surprisingly, the Congress did not approve the request to 
abolish the death penalty, traditionally a key point in the SSOBiH’s discourse, nor 
the proposal to modify the name of the organization into “Socialdemocrat Alliance” 
(Socijaldemocratski savez).62 Beyond the scepticism towards the leadership, a 
generally widespread inertia seemed more influenced by the adherence to routine 
or manifest individual interests for maintaining the status quo and the ensuing 
privileges, rather than by true allegiance to socialist principles. A harsh article 
56 Republička Konferencija SSOBiH, “Prijedlog – Politički manifest SSOBiH”, Sarajevo: SSOBiH, 1990, 4, 8, 12.
57 The proposal argued that Yugoslavia would be a federal and parliamentary democracy, based on the “citizen 
as the founding element of the political system” and provided with “jurisdictions on its whole territory, as well 
as instruments for their implementation, but must also be the guarantor for the autonomy [samobitnost] of the 
republics”. The parliamentary system would be bicameral, composed by a upper house, the Chamber of the 
Republics, with an equal representation of each republic; and a lower house, the Chamber of Citizens, based on 
the “one person-one vote” principle; instead, the republican parliaments would be mono-cameral, only based 
on regional (not ethno-national) representation. The Presidency would remain a collective organ composed by 
six members. Each republic shall suggest two or more candidates for its own seat and they shall be submitted to 
the vote of the whole Parliament. The elected members of the Presidency shall not be affiliated to any political 
party. Republička Konferencija SSOBiH, “Prijedlog – Politički manifest SSOBiH“, 6. This plan for constitutional 
reform was very similar to the one presented by the UJDI in earlier months (see ORLIĆ, ““Od postkomunizma 
do postjugoslavenstva”, 107).
58 “Prijedlog – Politički manifest SSOBiH”, 8.
59 The paragraph concerned to this issue, significantly titled “We are Europe” [Mi smo Evropa], affirmed: 
“Yugoslavia is geographically, historically, traditionally, genealogically, and culturally in Europe. It is only 
economically and politically ‘outside’ Europe. […] Yugoslavia needs a long-term economical, technological, 
market, financial cooperation and connection with the developed world, first of all with the Western Europe. In 
this course, the SSOBiH will support the inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the ‘Alpe-Adria’ Community and 
the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the EFTA and the European Community“. Ibidem, 11.
60 Only 158 of the 367 convened delegates supported the document. “Juče u Sarajevu počeo Kongres SSOBiH“, 
Bosanski Glas, Banja Luka, April 20, 1990.
61 “Novo ime Demokratski Savez”, Oslobođenje, April 21, 1990.
62 A mere compromise was reached by adding the more neutral title “Democratic Alliance” (Demokratski 
Savez, DS) to the existing name. “Novo ime Demokratski Savez”, Oslobođenje, April 21, 1990. 
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from the youth magazine Naši Dani commented: “We venture to say that students, 
young political officials in municipalities and professional activists are the most 
conservative stratum in the Yugoslav society who, in order to keep their social 
status and privileges, would defend egalitarianism in every possible way, including 
national-socialism if needed”. 63
After the Congress, the leadership managed, albeit with difficulty, to avoid 
an open breakup of the organization in order to keep control over its infrastructure. 
The SSOBiH finally succeeded to run for the elections in November 1990 and 
later turned itself into the Liberal-democrat Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, 
the SSOBiH entered the electoral campaign fragmented and incapable to take 
advantage of the small “political capital” that youth social movements in Bosnia 
had accumulated in the late 1980s. Although the SSOBiH had distanced itself 
from the Communists on ideological grounds, it was perceived as a part of the 
traditional political system and, especially, of the traditional political culture.64 As 
Kadić later acknowledged, the youth in Bosnia-Herzegovina, discontented about 
the poor socio-economic performance of the state, blamed the SSOBiH as partially 
responsible for that situation for having “ceased to represent the interest of youth 
as a social group”.65 This contributes to explain why, while many youngsters from 
non-urban environments simply perceived the SSOBiH as something alien from 
their own material experience, a considerable section of the urban and skilled 
youth did not believe in the bureaucratic structure of the organization.
63 Nerzuk ĆURAK, “Bio je kongres omladine. Rasprava o novčanim strastima”, Naši Dani, Sarajevo, April 
27, 1990. These allegations referred to both the Kadić’s leading group and its opposition. At that time Naši Dani, 
despite being a youth organ close to SSOBiH, did not abstain from critics to the leadership of the organization. 
64 BOŽIĆ, “Conversations with Bosnian Youth”, 749. The SSOBiH obtained less than 2% of votes and only 
two of 240 seats at the Bosnian legislative elections held in November 1990. The SSOBiH’s poor score must be 
considered in the frame of the heavy defeat of non-ethnic forces, whereas the three national parties (the Muslim 
SDA, the Serb SDS and the Croat HDZ) together secured about 75% of votes and 85% of seats in parliament, 
besides all the seven members of the presidency. On the November 1990 elections, see in particular: Suad 
ARNAUTOVIĆ, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini `90: analiza izbornog procesa, Sarajevo: Promocult, 1996; 
Virtuts SAMBRÒ, Anàlisi de les eleccions de 1990 a la R.S. de Bòsnia i Hercegovina, Madrid: Editorial 
Académica Española, 2012; Damir KAPIDŽIĆ, “Democratic Transition and Electoral Design in Plural 
Societies: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 1990 Elections”, Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics, (2015), 1-16.; Nenad STOJANOVIĆ, “When non-nationalist voters support ethno-nationalist 
parties: the 1990 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a prisoner’s dilemma game”, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, 14:4 (2014), 607-625.
65 Rasim Kadić, interview in BOŽIĆ, ibidem, 750.
3. “A third way, there is no other”. The UJDI in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The UJDI is widely considered as the first and main independent, non-
regime and all-Yugoslav movement in the pre-multiparty Yugoslav environment.66 
It was created on February 2, 1989, by a group of intellectuals from all the 
Federation, many of whom coming from circles of humanist, liberal-democrat or 
left-wing opposition to the Yugoslav regime in the 1970s and 1980s.67 The UJDI 
was grounded on two pillars. The first was the transformation of the state through 
the struggle for the “elementary preconditions” of democratization, namely 
the freedom of thought and expression, of political activity, of free multi-party 
elections. The second was the maintenance of Yugoslavia as a united, federal 
State, rejecting both centralist and separatist tendencies. In the course of 1989, the 
UJDI managed to establish branches all over the Federation, despite the hostility 
of the communist authorities. The central branch achieved formal recognition only 
on December 29, 1989 in Titograd (today Podgorica), Montenegro, after it had 
been denied both in Zagreb and Beograd.68
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UJDI envisaged similar problems with the 
authorities. The first section was established in Mostar on May 27 and in Sarajevo 
on June 21, 1989, but neither of them obtained the registration.69 Borislav Grahovac, 
one of the leaders of the Mostar branch, issued in 2009 an emphatic account of 
his experience: “We knew that for our activism we were risking our lives, but 
we did not know then to what extent. I later found out that we were included 
in a secret list for arrest or eventual execution. The communist government in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was fully aware of our activity. Spies were everywhere. The 
government of the ‘dark vilayet’ went so far as to draft a list of thirty intellectuals 
who were marked as dangerous, because they had democratic orientation and, in 
case of emergency state, would need to be liquidated”.70
66 The focus is here placed on the UJDI’s initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its interaction with the 
League of Communists and the opposition. On the UJDI’s ideological premises, Yugoslav-wide political actions 
and consequences, see: Mila ORLIĆ, “Od postkomunizma do postjugoslavenstva”; Ljubica SPASKOVSKA, 
“Vavilonski košmar”; Ljubica SPASKOVSKA, “Landscapes of Resistance, Hope and Loss: Yugoslav Supra-
Nationalism and Anti-Nationalism”, in Bojan BILIĆ, Vesna JANKOVIĆ, (eds.), Resisting the Evil, 37-61; Marco 
ABRAM, “L’UJDI. Un’esperienza alternativa nell’89 jugoslavo”, Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea, 
1 (2009), url: http://www.studistorici.com/2009/10/19/abram_ujdi, accessed on November 29, 2014; Edin 
OMERČIĆ, “Alternativna politička scena u Bosni Hercegovini (Udruženje za Jugoslavensku Demokratsku 
Inicijativu, Pretparlament jugoslavije, Forum za etničke odnose)”, Historijska traganja, 7 (2011), 231-239; Paul 
STUBBS, “Flex Actors and Philanthropy in (Post-)Conflict Arenas: Soros’ Open Society Foundations in the Post-
Yugoslav Space”, Croatian Political Science Review, 50, 5 (2013) 114-138.
67 ORLIĆ, “Od postkomunizma do postjugoslavenstva”, 101; ABRAM, “L’UJDI. Un’esperienza alternativa 
nell’89 jugoslavo”, 5.
68 ABRAM, “L’UJDI. Un’esperienza alternativa nell’89 jugoslavo”, 4.
69 “UJDI. Bez partijskih ambicija”, Oslobođenje, December 21, 1989. Later, UJDI branches were set in Tuzla, 
Konjic, Bijeljina, Živinice and Brčko.
70 Borislav GRAHOVAC, “UJDI u Mostaru, balkansko ogledalo (1). Odbacivanje komunizma”, 
Oslobođenje, April 1, 2009.
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The Bosnian official press mainly neglected the UJDI’s activity. In 1989, 
the daily Oslobođenje was still focused on institutional discourse and intra-party 
debate about (the lack of) reforms.71 The split of the League of Communists after 
the XIV Congress, bringing the perspective of a more rapid regime change, would 
barely open some space for the political opposition. Abdullah Sidran, the well-
known Bosnian writer and then a member of the Sarajevan UJDI, commented:72 
“This Bosnian small embroidery [bosanski sitni vez], whose core is the fear for 
the unknown, the anachronism, inertia and routine, is the basic plague of our 
actual political leadership. Those who only react to a recognized melody cannot 
develop a musical listening at all; in the same way, those who do not recognize 
the spirit of times do not have a political talent. The spectre of Europe is haunting 
Communism!73 […] Nonetheless, our political leadership ‘widely opens the 
doors’,74 sweeping away from its proximity all that is not old air. […] Here, there 
is no salvation, nor help”.75
The confrontation between UJDI and SKBiH became even more intense 
in early 1990, since the ruling party initially called for elections (scheduled for 
March 25-27, 1990) without approving a new law on political association, and then 
passed a norm that still kept some restriction on opposition parties. The Bosnian 
UJDI interpreted these moves as a comfortable way to neutralize the opposition 
and demanded to postpone of the vote. Even when ethno-nationalist mobilization 
was already emerging, the Bosnian UJDI focused its critics on the Communist 
rule as the primary responsible for the “institutionalized nationalism” and the 
ethnic homogenization that led to the formation of chauvinist forces as its logic 
consequence.76 For this reason, the UJDI, coherent with its liberal concept, did 
not support the choice of the SKBiH to maintain the ban on national parties.77 
Due to its democracy-first and anti-authoritarian approach, the UJDI did not take 
into consideration an eventual cooperation with the Bosnian Communists based 
on their common stance, namely a non-nationalist and pro-Yugoslav orientation. 
The UJDI’s leaders, who still resented the hostility of state structures, simply did 
71 As Edin Omerčić recalls, the press followed the “cosmetic changes in the then ruling party”. Edin OMERČIĆ, 
“Alternativna politička scena”, 232.
72 Paradoxically, in the pages of the same Oslobođenje, where he wrote as a columnist.
73 This phrase, obviously a gig on the well-known preamble of Marx’s Manifesto, was a quote from the 
Zagreban writer Josip Sever (1938-1989), a Sidran’s friend. Abdulah SIDRAN, “Jugoslavenski savez i bosanski 
sitni vez”, Oslobođenje, March 11, 1990.
74 This is a reference to the famous phrase pronounced by Duraković during the XIV Congress against the 
supporters of the “Bosnian Initiative” (see part 1 of this work).
75 Abdulah SIDRAN, “Jugoslavenski savez i bosanski sitni vez”, Oslobođenje, March 11, 1990. Interestingly, 
the Sidran’s animosity towards the Bosnian Communists echoed (though from a different perspective) the typical 
labels of “tamni vilajet”, dogmatism, conformism, etc., traditionally attributed to the SKBiH in previous years by 
different actors, such as non-party intellectuals or political leaders from the other republics.
76 Željko REBAC, “Nacionalizam ne treba da čudi“, in Oslobođenje, March 14, 1990.
77 “Tribina UJDI-ja u Mostaru. BiH nije ničiji trofej“, Oslobođenje, April 14, 1990; Gajo Sekulić, interview by 
author, Sarajevo, May 15, 2014. 
not trust a Communists’ self-reform. As Gajo Sekulić affirmed, “with them [the 
Communists] there was no chance to cooperate. […] We have made a third way 
between nationalists and old communists. This is a liberal-democratic way, there 
is no other”.78 
This positioning does not imply that the UJDI embraced a radical anti-
communist line, a label that, for instance, its members generally rejected, as they 
did not want to be associated with the emerging nationalist movements who were 
exploiting anti-socialist aversion to reinforce their discourse.79 Moreover, most 
of the UJDI’s prominent members had a left-wing background and individually 
identified themselves with progressive socialist or social-democratic ideas. On the 
other hand, the Association avoided taking position on socio-economic issues, 
not only to safeguard its internal heterogeneity, but also to respect the deliberate 
choice of focusing on the pre-conditions of democracy as the central goal of the 
organization.
Another cornerstone of the Bosnian UJDI, particularly in the course of 
1990 when political polarization on national lines was rising, was the defence 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s integrity and autonomy. The Association denounced the 
“paternalistic” interferences of some nationalist movements from other Yugoslav 
republics, particularly from Croatia and Serbia, which were constantly making 
unfounded references to the alleged discrimination that either Croats, Serbs or 
Muslims were suffering in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “We affirm that the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian citizens, in the forms that they can elaborate and establish by 
themselves, are able to carry out all the tasks that the adoption of parliamentary 
democracy has assigned them in this republic and in Yugoslavia”, said a statement of 
the Bosnian UJDI issued on May 20, 1990. Its far-sighted assessment was that such 
claims from nationalist movements were driven by domestic political opportunism 
and represented an unacceptable justification for territorial pretensions that, 
besides violating the democratizing process in the republic, could contribute to 
the break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the whole country.80
Although the Yugoslav UJDI had, initially, firmly rejected to take the 
shape of a political party, its Bosnian branch constantly debated whether they 
should take part in the electoral competition or not. At one point, the Bosnian 
78 Gajo Sekulić, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 15, 2014. 
79 Abdulah KOVAČEVIĆ, “Proizvođać antikomunizma“, Naši Dani, April 27, 1990. Kovačević was a member 
of the UJDI branch in Bijeljina.
80 The statement was reported in “Protest UJDI-a – Zajednica podružnica BiH. Protiv pokliča ‘očinskih 
stratega’ “, Borba, May 21, 1990. It specifically alluded to some statements from the Croatian HDZ, the League 
of Communists of Serbia and the SNO (Serbian National Renewal, the far-right movement founded by Vuk 
Drašković and Vojislav Šešelj) which had called into question the autonomy and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In that period, outrage among non-national Bosnian political circles was spreading after a comment of Šime 
Đodan, a prominent member of the Croatian HDZ, claiming that Bosnia-Herzegovina was “Croatian from ancient 
times” and that a Croatian flag would have flown on the top of Mount Romanija (i.e. over Sarajevo) within a few 
years. ANDJELIĆ, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 165.
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UJDI even announced its will to run for elections,81 but finally withdrew and 
directed its efforts in inspiring and coordinating a united, democratic and non-
national opposition, together with movements and personalities from the cultural 
and intellectual world.82 The result was the creation of the Democratic Forum 
(Demokratski Forum, DF), composed of the UJDI, the Alliance of Socialist Youth 
(SSOBiH), the Democratic Party (DP), and the Socialdemocrat Alliance (SS).83 
The Forum’s principles coincided with those promoted by the UJDI, namely the 
foundation of an “authentic democracy”, where the sovereignty would be entrusted 
to the individual citizens of the Republics and the Federation. Those concepts, 
as it was stated in the presentation, “imply safeness, freedom and all the rights 
of the Serbs in Croatia, of the Croats in Vojvodina, of the Muslims in Serbia, 
of the Montenegrins in Slovenia etc. Since our peoples are so intersected and 
mixed, a totalitarian concept of narrow-mindness and self-sufficiency, wherever 
it is applied, cannot be a democratic solution for the existence, the prosperity and 
the happiness of the citizens of Yugoslavia as a whole”. 84 The Forum stated its 
opposition to the “ruling doctrine of the sovereignty of the peoples and the nation”, 
rejecting any “ideological and political totalitarianism”, which also included the 
emerging movements with “negative mono-national sign”. The Forum promoted 
a third-way, “democratic-alternative” option, equally distant from both the 
“bolshevik” and the “strictly national” movements.85 However, the Forum failed 
almost immediately to represent an aggregating factor, due to the lack of material 
and financial resources, the enormous difficulties to pierce into the public space 
because of the very unstable conditions for political pluralism in Bosnia, and some 
internal discrepancies. The Forum de facto ceased to exist soon and each of its 
founding movements continued to act separately.
Another main issue on which the Bosnian UJDI focused its attention was 
the conflict in Kosovo. The Mostar branch, under the decisive initiative of its 
leader Željko Rebac, organized and hosted some of the round tables (attended by 
representatives from all the sides involved in the issue) that the Yugoslav UJDI 
promoted in order to set the stage for dialogue. These initiatives reveal the strong 
pro-Yugoslav commitment of the UJDI, which recognized the Kosovo issue as 
the trigger of the social-political crisis in the whole Federation, suggesting that 
81 “UJDI ide na izbore”, Borba, June 26, 1990.
82 Gajo Sekulić, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 15, 2014. Sekulić claims that, among others, the famous 
film director Emir Kusturica attended the project in its first phase, but he abandoned it for individual conflicts and 
lack of interest. Kusturica later joined the Alliance of Reformist Forces (SRSJ).
83 The two leaders of DP (Demokratska Partija) and SS (Socijaldemokratski Savez) were respectively Petar 
Milić and Borislav Grahovac, also leading members of the UJDI branch in Mostar. Both these parties would be 
completely marginal in the Bosnian political spectrum, being active practically only in Mostar, relying on a low 
number of members.
84 M. KARABEG, “Nakon formiranja Demokratskog Foruma BiH. Mjesto pod suncem pluralizma“, 
Oslobođenje, May 14, 1990.
85 Ibidem.
no democratic progress in Yugoslavia, not even in each single republic, would 
have been achieved without reaching a solution for the province. Once more, the 
promoters attracted the attention of the security services 86 and had some quarrels 
with the press.87 Despite these obstacles, and although some inevitable polemics 
arising during the meetings, the UJDI succeeded to complete the cycle of round 
tables and to attract a certain interest from the public.88 Nevertheless, such efforts 
mostly remained a dead letter, as they did not encourage a further engagement 
from other organizations, let alone by the official institutions. Moreover, the fact 
that the electoral competition was to be played at the republican level, rather than 
at the Yugoslav one, implied that domestic issues in each federal unity would 
be primarily relevant in the campaign, besides the influence of socio-economic 
effects or the perception of inter-ethnic relations in workplaces and everyday life 
of the citizens. 
In conclusion, the UJDI in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not achieve the goal 
of encouraging the pre-conditions of pluralism. The (slow) progress of Bosnian 
transition was determined more by factors occurring outside Bosnia-Herzegovina 
itself and inside the narrow élite of the republican rule, rather than by civic 
pushes from below. The Bosnian Communists remained indifferent to the UJDI’s 
demands. Their first source of concern always remained the emergence of national 
parties, while the democratic alternatives were seen as too weak to be considered 
either a counterpart or a serious opponent. The UJDI’s deliberate choice to 
remain a cultural-intellectual organization, with a “vanguard” political content 
rejecting the party form, would have needed more time to consolidate itself. The 
UJDI’ focus on democratization, consciously leaving the socio-economic and the 
national question aside as a sub-product of the political impasse, limited its sphere 
of action and the potential interest of wider segments of the population. This was 
particularly true in the Bosnian context, upset by strikes and unrest stemming 
from the economic crisis, besides mutual fears of resurging national mobilizations.
86 Gajo Sekulić, interview by author, Sarajevo, May 15, 2014.
87 The Sarajevan daily Oslobođenje gave little visibility to the events and covered them with varying degrees 
of criticism. Some articles were balanced, other implicitly undermined the UJDI’s activism labelling it as biased 
and “pretentious”, allegedly favouring the Albanian side (See, for example, M. KARABEG, A. BEHRAM, 
“UJDI-ev skup o Kosovu: novi korak I stari raskolarci”, Oslobođenje, March 2, 1990; from same authors, “UJDI-
eva tribina o Kosovu pred Mostarcima. Dijalog potvrdio nepomirljivost”, Oslobođenje, March 3, 1990). Other 
newspapers were even sharper. The Belgrade-based Večernje Novosti defined the initiative a “farce of democracy” 
and accused the association for supporting Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia, although the UJDI 
was firmly opposing any change to the existing borders. Such coverage was the cause of a public controversy 
between Željko Rebac (the leader of the Mostar UJDI) and Radivoje Gutić (the Večernje Novosti’s correspondent 
from Mostar), through letters issued in the daily Oslobođenje. Rebac liquidated Gutić as a “pub-talk informer” 
[denuncijant kafanskog tipa] and a “local regime slave”. Radivoje GUTIĆ, “UJDI-Olimp and novinar-vratar”, 
Oslobođenje, March 19, 1990; Željko REBAC,“Reagovanja. Vodič u prošlost”, Oslobođenje, March 23, 1990. 
88 The UJDI’s round tables also brought to the issue of a report titled Kosovski čvor. Drešiti ili seći (“The Kosovo 
Knot. Untie or cut?”. URL available here: http://pescanik.net/wp-content/PDF/Srdja/kosovskicvordresitiiliseci.
pdf, accessed December 9, 2014), grounded on a solid quantitative and qualitative research aiming to demystify 
the typical propagandistic arguments on the Kosovo question. 
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Epilogue
Civic-oriented initiatives inspired by the SKBiH’s reformist wing, the 
SSOBiH and the UJDI shared a sharp focus on the struggle for political reform in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. All the three options openly challenged the 
resistance to change of the ruling Bosnian elite, as well as the exclusivist narratives 
of the nationalist-oriented movements. Their firm commitment for the integrity of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the unity of a federal Yugoslavia was materialized into 
the articulation of concrete and far-sighted proposals, such as the almost identical 
proposals submitted by the SSOBiH and the UJDI for a constitutional reform of 
Yugoslavia as a federal, parliamentary bicameral democracy.
On the other hand, the three initiatives differed in their practices, 
strategies and communicative approaches. The party reformers led by Grebo used 
all their political capital and media exposition in an intra-elite struggle against 
the Bosnian leadership, but they ended up completely marginalized. The SSOBiH 
strived to defend its own official infrastructure in order to become a political 
party, which would produce poor results. The UJDI on the contrary, remained 
practically confined to the intellectual-cultural ground and barely appeared in 
the public space, not only because of restraints from media and institutions, but 
also because of their staunch refusal of engaging themselves as a political party. 
Attempts to create broad cross-cut platforms, such as the ZAVNOBiH Initiative 
or the Democratic Forum, failed because of lack of material resources, combined 
with uncertainties and disagreements over the practical steps that could be taken, 
in a context of extremely volatile circumstances and expectations in the political 
spectrum. None of these initiatives managed to build a social consensus around 
their projects, both inside the official structures and in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
society at large.
The existential insecurity that poor socio-economic performance and 
perceptions of worsening inter-ethnic relations originated, finally brought many 
people to cast their vote for national parties (SDA, SDS and HDZ)89 in the November 
1990 elections. Moreover, the slow and hesitant progress of a multi-party system 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (constitutional reforms were completed only in July 1990, 
due to attempts from Communists to keep the ban on national parties) reduced the 
chances for civic-alternative options, which would need more stable conditions in 
order to consolidate themselves. Conversely, national parties bypassed easily the 
ban even before they were legalized, thanks to the significant help offered by their 
respective clergies, influential intellectual circles (and, in case of Serb and Croat 
parties, from the neighbour republics), besides gradually enjoying some undeniable 
89 Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, i.e. Muslim); Serb Democratic Party (Srpska 
Demokratska Stranka); Croat Democratic Community (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica).
territorial support in some regions. The electoral campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
began once the triumph of national parties in Slovenia and Croatia had already 
brought a severe escalation of the political conflict along the Ljubljana-Zagreb-
Belgrade axis, hindering the chance to revive a federal, supra-national dimension. 
Combining a pro-Yugoslav discourse with an intra-republican sphere of action 
became increasingly problematic for any civic-alternative platform. Finally, the 
appearance in July 1990 of the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia (SRSJ), 
the Ante Marković’s party, paradoxically installed further polarization in the non-
national field instead of acting as a cohesive force.90
The stigma of dogmatism left by the “burden of the past” (“hipoteka iz 
prošlosti”) still haunted the SKBiH despite its advances in self-reform and its 
gradual switch to social-democracy. Hence, any chance for a huge anti-nationalist 
coalition between pro-Yugoslav parties was immediately discarded and led to a 
heavily fragmented scenario, paradoxically confronting a pragmatic synergy 
from the three ethnic parties. Besides being unable to break the silence of an inert 
and declining regime, the civic alternatives failed also to reduce the loudness of 
nationalist narratives. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Bosnian anti-
war activism taking shape since 1991 rested upon the political, organizational and 
personal networks that those same intellectuals, youth movements, affinity groups, 
etc., had been establishing in previous years. They set the bases for a continuum 
of civic resistance that, despite the destructive war and post-war events, has lasted 
until today.
90 For more details on the SRSJ, see Alfredo SASSO, “The defeat of the democratic Yugoslavism in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia (SRSJ)”, in Antonello BIAGINI, Giovanna MOTTA 
(eds.), Empires and Nations from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century. Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge 
Scholars, 2014, 563-575. 
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SAŽETAK
‘BOSANSKA ŠUTNJA’? PAD REŽIMA I GRAĐANSKE ALTERNATIVE 
U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI (1989.-1990.)
Alfredo SASSO
Članak teži analizirati građansku, pro-jugoslavensku i pro-
demokratizacijsku opciju u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1989. do sredine 90-tih. Te 
platforme pružile su alternative nacionalnim narativima i politici i, istovremeno, 
„službenom jugoslavizmu“ kojeg je predstavljao Savez komunista Bosne i 
Hercegovine (SKBiH). Vladajuća partija zadržala je ne-nacionalan i pro-
jugoslavenski stav zbog ideološkog pravovjerja svoje elite te zbog nacionalne 
heterogenosti Bosne i Hercegovine. Međutim, ona je imala kolebljiv pristup na 
putu prema političkom pluralizmu te višestranačkim izborima.
Članak se usmjerava na tri najznačajnija građansko-alternativna projekta 
u bosanskom političkom miljeu 1989. Prvi je radikalno reformno krilo Saveza 
komunista koje je tražilo auto-transformaciju partije i države, potičući tzv. 
ZAVNOBiH inicijativu te Balkansku inicijativu na posljednjem kongresu Saveza. 
Ti su prijedlozi zahtijevali trenutno ispunjenje preduvjeta za pluralizam i uvođenje 
višestranačkog sustava. Drugi, Savez socijalističke omladine Bosne i Hercegovine 
(SSOBiH), koji je iznikao iz rastućih gradskih omladinskih socijalističkih pokreta 
kasnih 80-tih, snažno je preispitivao režimsku kontrolu i ideologiju. Prije nego što 
se pretvorio u zasebnu partiju i, dok je još uvijek bio službeni dio Saveza komunista, 
Savez socijalističke omladine razvio je nezavisnu politiku i zamislio “radikalnu 
rekonstrukciju” jugoslavenske federacije temeljenu na liberalno-demokratskim 
principima. Treći, Udruženje za jugoslavensku demokratsku inicijativu (UJDI), za 
razliku od prethodna dva projekta, stvoren je izvan službenih okvira te je većinom 
sastavljen od progresivnih intelektualaca. Dok se borio za “osnovne preduvjete” 
demokratizacije te za unifikaciju građanske opozicije, UJDI je čitavo vrijeme bio 
suočen s neprijateljskim pristupom bosanskih komunističkih vlasti.
Sve te građanske-alternativne inicijative nisu uspjele izgraditi društveni 
konsenzus oko svojih platformi. Odnosi između njih i SKBiH ostao je izrazito 
konfliktan jer je otpor promjenama dolazio iz raznih sektora unutar Saveza te 
posljedično zbog “stigme dogmatizma” koja se asocirala uz vladajuću partiju. Spor 
i oprezan napredak političkih reformi u Bosni i Hercegovini umanjivao je šanse 
građansko-alternativnim opcijama dok su nacionalne stranke zaobilazile postojeće 
zabrane te iskoristile rastuću eskalaciju tenzija u jugoslavenskom scenariju.
